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ABSTRACT 
 
Consistent with agency theory, corporate governance best practices encourage 
the use of a director stock ownership requirement (SOR) as a tool to align directors’ 
incentives with shareholders’ interests. Using a sample of 714 firms that adopt a director 
SOR from 1998 to 2013, I analyze the determinants of SOR adoption and find that firms 
with larger boards, lower outside director ownership, and higher institutional ownership 
are more likely to implement a director SOR. I then show that firms adopting a director 
SOR demonstrate improved monitoring over financial reporting. However, I find no 
evidence indicating that adopting firms have greater CEO performance-turnover 
sensitivity after director SOR adoption. Further, it appears that firms adopting a director 
SOR have greater excess CEO compensation. Finally, I classify adopted plans as 
substantial or symbolic and show that substantial adopters demonstrate improved 
financial reporting monitoring while symbolic adopters do not. My results suggest that a 
director SOR can be effective in improving board financial reporting monitoring 
performance when the requirement is substantial. However, many firms appear to adopt 
symbolic requirements, possibly as a form of corporate governance window-dressing, 
rather than as an effective tool to increase the alignment between directors and 
shareholders.  
 iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank my committee chair, Lynn Rees, and my committee 
members, Nathan Sharp, Shiva Sivaramakrishnan, Adrienne Rhodes, and Steve Boivie 
for their guidance and support throughout the course of this research. 
I would also like to thank Tom Omer, Sarah Rice, Stevie Neuman, Frances Tice, 
Erik Beardsley and accounting workshop participants at Texas A&M University, Texas 
Christian University and Oklahoma State University for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. I also want to extend my gratitude to the ResearchScholars@Mays program 
for assistance in collecting data. 
 iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Page 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................    ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..........................................................................................   iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..............................................................................................   iv 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................   vi 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................  vii 
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................    1 
2. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR LITERATURE ....................................................   7 
 2.1 Background on Director SORs .....................................................................   7 
 2.2 Prior Literature on Director Ownership .......................................................   9 
 2.3 Prior Literature on SORs ............................................................................   10 
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT .......................................................................   13 
 3.1 Determinants of Director SOR Adoption ...................................................   13 
 3.2 Consequences of Director SOR Adoption .................................................   15 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN ..........................................................................................   20 
 4.1 Determinants of Director SOR Adoption ...................................................   20 
 4.2 Consequences of Director SOR Adoption .................................................   22 
 4.3 Substantial and Symbolic Director SOR Adoption ....................................   26 
5. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ............................   29 
6. RESULTS .............................................................................................................   33 
 6.1 Determinants of Director SOR Adoption ...................................................   33 
 6.2 Consequences of Director SOR Adoption .................................................   35 
7. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS .................................................................................   42 
8. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................   44 
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................   46 
 v 
 
APPENDIX A ..............................................................................................................   50 
APPENDIX B ..............................................................................................................   53 
APPENDIX C ..............................................................................................................   54 
 vi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE  Page 
1 Adoption of Director Stock Ownership Requirements (SORs) .......................   55 
2 Director SOR Compared to Actual Director Ownership .................................   56 
 
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE Page 
1 Sample Selection ..............................................................................................   57 
2 Director SORs at Time of Adoption ................................................................   58 
3 Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................................   59 
4 Determinants of Director SOR Adoption .........................................................   61 
5 Consequences of Director SOR Adoption: Financial Reporting Monitoring ..   62 
6 Consequences of Director SOR Adoption: CEO Performance Monitoring .....   65 
7 Consequences of Director SOR Adoption: CEO Compensation Monitoring ..   67 
8 Determinants of Substantial and Symbolic Director SOR Adoption ...............   70 
 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many companies require outside directors to own a specified amount of stock in 
the company, known as a director stock ownership requirement (SOR). This practice is 
consistent with agency theory, which suggests that greater financial ties can mitigate 
conflicts of interests by aligning agents’ incentives with principals’ desires (e.g., Fama, 
1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989).1 Prior research has shown that 
director stock ownership is associated with more effective board monitoring (e.g., 
Beasley, 1996; Bhagat, Carey and Elson, 1999; Ertugrul and Krishnan, 2011; Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008; Zerni, Kallunki and Nilsson, 2010). However, research on whether 
director SORs are effective in aligning outside directors’ incentives with shareholders’ 
interests is limited. Additionally, some practitioners have voiced concerns that director 
stock ownership requirements are too low, suggesting that director SORs as currently 
implemented do not induce incentive alignment (Barton and Wiseman, 2015). In this 
study, I empirically examine whether the adoption of a director SOR serves to align 
directors’ incentives with shareholders interests’ or alternatively, serves as a form of 
corporate governance window-dressing. Specifically, I address three key research 
questions: (1) what are the board- and firm-level characteristics that influence a firm’s 
                                                 
1 Larcker and Tayan (2012) suggest that if the monitor’s objective is to detect and mitigate agency 
problems, and success of the objective is defined as error prevention, then monitors should be paid on a 
fixed-salary basis, with significant punishment for failures. However, an entirely fixed compensation 
package may not provide sufficient incentive (e.g., Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Archambeault, 
DeZoort and Hermanson, 2008), particularly if director concerns extend beyond compensation to retention 
and reputation (Yermack, 2004). Research that focuses on the alignment of long-term interests 
recommends compensating outside directors with stock (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Yermack, 2004). 
In contrast, Drymiotes and Sivaramakrishnan (2012) argue that long-term incentives may be beneficial for 
board advising, but not for corporate governance. 
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adoption of a director SOR; (2) is the adoption of a director SOR associated with 
improved board monitoring (e.g., lower likelihood of subsequent financial irregularities, 
greater likelihood of CEO turnover given poor firm performance, and lower excess CEO 
compensation); and (3) does the effectiveness of a director SOR vary based on whether 
the requirement is substantial? 
Understanding whether the adoption of a director SOR is associated with 
improved board performance is important because effective monitoring by the board is 
an essential component of corporate governance (e.g., Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2008; Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2012). Following major corporate scandals in the 2000s 
(e.g., WorldCom, Tyco and Enron), board oversight as a governance mechanism 
attracted considerable attention. Regulatory solutions for improving board oversight 
have focused on increasing the proportion of independent directors on the board. (U.S. 
House of Representatives 2002, §301.B; NYSE 2003, §303A.7a; NASDAQ 2010, 
§5605.c.2).2 While independence improves directors’ abilities to monitor the firm free of 
manager’s influence, independent board members by definition have less information 
about the firm than inside board members, resulting in increased costs to provide 
monitoring (e.g., Berle and Means, 1991; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993). 
Further, independent directors typically own fewer shares in the firm than inside 
                                                 
2 The NYSE mandates and the NASDAQ recommends that the compensation, nominating, and audit 
committees be entirely staffed with independent directors. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 
requires that the audit committee is comprised entirely of independent directors, including at least one 
financial expert. Independence is typically determined as having no significant relationship with the 
company beyond being directors. In the U.S., ownership is not necessarily considered a deterrent to 
independence. 
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directors. Higher costs to attain relevant information and lower financial alignment 
contributes to a secondary agency issue at the board level between outside directors and 
shareholders (e.g., Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer, 
2010; Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010). 
One mechanism used to mitigate the potential misalignment between outside 
directors’ and shareholders’ interests is to institute a director SOR for outside directors. 
Similar to an executive target ownership plan (“TOP”), a director SOR mandates a 
minimum level of stock ownership that outside directors are expected to acquire and 
hold until retirement.3 Prior research provides evidence that executive TOPs are 
effective in increasing executive stock ownership and diffusing agency conflicts between 
managers and shareholders (e.g., Core and Larcker, 2002; Quinn, 2015). However a key 
difference is that the board of directors defines and implements director SORs for 
themselves. This decision-making authority creates potential confounds to what we 
know about ownership requirements as the board has the decision to adopt a substantial 
policy or a symbolic policy.4 Prior studies have not investigated whether the adoption of 
a director SOR is associated with an improvement in board performance nor have prior 
studies addressed the variability in implementation of director SORs. 
Utilizing a unique sample of 714 firms adopting a director SOR from 1998 to 
2013, I first examine the determinants of a firm’s decision to adopt a director SOR. I 
                                                 
3 Inside directors typically own more shares in the company through employee stock ownership plans 
(ESOPs). Additionally, executive TOPs are set as a multiple of salary. As executive salaries are typically 
much higher than director salaries, executive TOPs are typically much higher than director SORs. 
4 Similarly, some firms have been shown to adopt a corporate code of conduct as “window dressing” 
(Clarkson, 1995). 
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find that firms with a higher percentage of outside directors and lower outside director 
ownership are more likely to adopt a director SOR. I also find evidence that firms with 
other external monitors and better information environments (e.g., firms with higher 
institutional ownership, firms with higher analyst following) are more likely to adopt a 
director SOR, suggesting that firms do not necessarily use a director SOR as a substitute 
for other monitoring mechanisms. 
I then examine whether the adoption of a director SOR is associated with 
effective board monitoring. I proxy for effective board monitoring using three outcomes: 
financial irregularities, CEO performance-turnover sensitivity, and excess CEO 
compensation. Using a difference-in-differences design along with propensity score 
matching to address sample selection bias, I document evidence of a negative association 
between the likelihood of subsequent financial irregularities after the adoption of a 
director SOR, suggesting that adopting firms exhibit improved financial reporting 
monitoring. In contrast, I find evidence suggesting a positive association between the 
adoption of a director SOR and excess CEO compensation, indicating that directors do 
not exhibit improved compensation monitoring after the adoption of a director SOR. 
However, I do not find any evidence indicating that firms adopting a director SOR 
exhibit greater CEO performance-turnover sensitivity.  
I next examine whether the effectiveness of the director SOR varies based on 
whether the director SOR is substantial. I consider ownership requirements that are 
compelling and material to be substantial while ownership requirements that are either 
not compelling or immaterial are characterized as symbolic. I define a director SOR as 
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compelling if less than 75 percent of the board met the director SOR in the year prior to 
adoption. I classify the materiality of a director SOR as robust, standard, or sub-standard 
based on the ownership requirement as a multiple of director fees.5 The resulting 
analysis indicates a lower likelihood of subsequent financial irregularities after the 
adoption of a compelling director SOR, suggesting that firms adopting a compelling 
SOR exhibit improved financial reporting monitoring. I also find that this result is 
stronger for firms adopting a compelling SOR relative to firms that adopt a non-
compelling SOR. I find cross sectional variation in the effect of a director SOR on board 
monitoring. Specifically, I document that firms adopting a compelling and robust 
director SOR or a compelling and standard director SOR are less likely to experience a 
financial irregularity than firms adopting a compelling yet sub-standard director SOR. 
Overall, the results suggest that the adoption of a compelling and material (at least three 
times the annual director retainer) director SOR is effective in improving board financial 
reporting monitoring performance. In contrast, I do not find evidence indicating that the 
adoption of a non-compelling or immaterial director SOR is any more or less effective in 
improving CEO performance sensitivity or CEO compensation monitoring. 
In additional analysis, I re-examine the determinants of director SOR adoption to 
differentiate between substantial adopters and symbolic adopters. Using a generalized 
ordered logistic regression, I show that firms with fewer outside directors, lower outside 
                                                 
5 This classification is based on ISS Governance Quick Score 3.0 methodology, which considers a firm’s 
stock ownership requirement as a multiple of director retainer. A director SOR is considered robust if the 
ownership guideline is five times or more of the director’s annual retainer, standard if the guideline is less 
than five but greater than three times the director’s annual retainer, and sub-standard if the guideline is less 
than three times the director’s annual retainer (Institutional Shareholder Services, 2014). 
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director ownership and lower tenure are more likely to implement a substantial director 
SOR than a symbolic director SOR. 
This paper makes several contributions to the corporate governance and director 
incentives literature. The study contributes to the literature on director incentives by 
examining an additional tool that can be used to align directors’ incentives. Additionally, 
this study contributes to the literature on stock ownership requirements (e.g., Core and 
Larcker, 2002; Quinn, 2015; Bhagat and Tookes, 2012). As one of the few studies to 
examine a director SOR in the context of board monitoring, I provide some initial 
evidence that the adoption of a substantial director SOR is effective in aligning directors’ 
incentives with shareholders’ interests while the adoption of a symbolic director SOR 
may not be. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses 
background information and prior research. Section 3 presents the hypotheses 
development. Section 4 discusses research design choices and variable definitions. 
Section 5 provides information on the sample selection and descriptive statistics. Section 
6 provide results to hypotheses tests while Section 7 provides additional analysis and 
Section 8 concludes. 
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2. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR LITERATURE 
2.1 Background on Director SORs 
Numerous shareholder groups and business associations strongly encourage the 
use of a director SOR in order to align directors’ interests with shareholders’ interests 
(e.g., Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), 2014; Meridian, 2011; Business 
Roundtable, 2012). In Meridian’s 2011 report on director compensation, firms are 
encouraged to implement a director SOR, 
“to create alignment between individual wealth and the long-term 
performance of the firm; to minimize excessive risk-taking that 
might lead to short-term returns at the expense of long-term value 
creation; to build an ownership mentality among executives and to 
align with good governance principles supporting many 
shareholder groups.” (p.1). 
 
Accordingly, many firms adopting a director SOR indicate their motivation is better 
alignment of directors’ and shareholders’ interests. For example, the section titled 
“Corporate Governance” in SkyWork Solution’s 2011 proxy statement states their 
intention for requiring director stock ownership: 
“We have adopted Executive Officer and Director Stock 
Ownership programs that require our executive officers (including 
our Named Executive Officers) and non-employee directors to 
hold a significant equity interest in Skyworks with the objective of 
more closely aligning the interests of our executive officers and 
directors with those of our stockholders…”(p.21). 
 
Director SORs are disclosed in firms’ proxy statements and/or corporate 
guidelines. For fiscal years ending after December 15, 2006, the SEC requires disclosure 
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of both executive and director SORs.6 However, prior to this date many firms with a 
director SOR voluntarily disclosed its adoption.7 In my sample of the largest 750 firms 
by market capitalization at any point from 1998 to 2013, I find that 64.7 percent of firms 
utilize a director SOR in 2013, up from 2.2 percent in 1998.8 
Similar to an executive TOP, a director SOR specifies a minimum amount of 
firm stock to be acquired over a specific time period following initial appointment. The 
compensation or governance committee is typically responsible for recommending the 
adoption of a director SOR, as well as setting the ownership requirement, the length of 
time allowed to achieve the ownership requirement and the types of equity that qualify 
for inclusion. Ownership requirements are typically specified as a “multiple of retainer” 
(i.e., level of ownership is as a multiple of the annual director retainer); “dollar value” 
(i.e., level of ownership is a specific dollar value amount); “shares” (i.e., level of 
ownership is a fixed number of shares); or some combination of the three. The most 
common type of director SOR is the multiple of retainer, while the average time allowed 
to acquire the required ownership ranges from three to five years. Most firms consider 
all of the following to qualify as equity for purposes of a director SOR: shares owned 
outright or beneficially by directors (or immediate family members), stock units held 
                                                 
6 While disclosure of ownership requirements is now mandatory, the actual content of the disclosure is not 
prescribed. The majority of adopting firms in the sample provide detail on the form of ownership 
requirement (multiple of retainer, fixed shares, and fixed dollar value), amount, and time allowed to meet 
the ownership requirement. However, not all firms provide detail on the assessment period for a director 
SOR or the forms of stock ownership that count towards meeting an ownership requirement. 
7 Bhagat and Tookes (2012) argue that there is not likely a reason why firms would not want to disclose 
ownership requirements. 
8 Equilar (2011) reports that 76 percent of Fortune 100 firms in 2010 use a director SOR. Equilar’s 
findings are likely higher than mine due to their smaller sample biased toward larger firms. 
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under a non-qualified deferred compensation plan, and restricted stock or restricted stock 
units. Some firms additionally allow vested but unexercised options to qualify and a few 
also allow unvested and unexercised options. 
In addition to defining and implementing a director SOR, the board of directors 
is also responsible for assessing compliance with the director SOR. Many firms assess 
compliance at least annually, typically at the end of the year or prior to the issuance of 
the proxy statement. Stated consequences for non-compliance typically include a 
prohibition on sales, payment of annual retainer in equity instead of cash, and mandatory 
retention of annual equity grants until compliance is met (Equilar, 2013).9 The board has 
discretion to temporarily suspend the director SOR either for all directors during times of 
deteriorating economic conditions or for particular directors in cases of personal 
hardship. 
2.2 Prior Literature on Director Ownership 
Consistent with agency theory, prior empirical research supports the view that 
director stock ownership is associated with more effective monitoring (lower likelihood 
of financial statement fraud (Beasley, 1996); more timely decisions to the replace CEO 
(Bhagat et al., 1999; Ertugrul and Krishnan, 2011); higher probability of forced CEO 
turnover after poor performance (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008); and more stringent auditing 
requirements (Zerni et al., 2010). However, more recent behavioral studies suggest that 
director ownership can induce self-interested behavior that may be detrimental to the 
                                                 
9 Limited information or cases are available at this point to further study enforcement. As indicated by the 
rate of adoption of non-compelling SORs, non-compliance is unlikely at most firms. 
 10 
 
firm’s long-term value (e.g., Magilke, Mayhew and Pike, 2009). These studies suggest 
that equity ownership may also motivate individuals to focus on short-term performance 
rather than long-term performance.10 Carcello and Neal (2003) find that director 
ownership is positively associated with the likelihood of auditor dismissal following the 
issuance of a going concern opinion; arguing that directors who own more company 
stock are likely to suffer losses if the going-concern report triggers a negative stock price 
response, so directors with more ownership are more willing to accede to auditor 
dismissals in such cases.  
However, these studies focus on the association between director ownership and 
board performance where the director ownership is assumed to be endogenous. The 
decision to implement a director stock ownership requirement may obscure the signal of 
director ownership. Thus, it is important to examine the determinants and consequences 
of imposing director stock ownership requirements.  
2.3 Prior Literature on SORs 
Studies examining the effect of adopting executive TOPs are relevant, with the 
caveat that executives do not have the authority to set their own targets. Core and 
Larcker (2002) is one of the first studies to document the use of executive TOPs during 
1996 and 1997 and find that managerial stock ownership, excess accounting returns, and 
                                                 
10 Research that focuses on the alignment of long-term interests recommends compensating outside 
directors with stock (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Yermack, 2004). In contrast, Drymiotes and 
Sivaramakrishnan (2012) argue that long-term incentives may be beneficial for board advising, but not 
necessarily for corporate governance; while Larcker and Tayan (2012) suggest that if the monitor’s 
objective is to detect and mitigate agency problems, and success of the objective is defined as error 
prevention, then monitors should be paid on a fixed-salary basis with significant punishment for failures. 
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excess stock returns are all higher following the adoption of an executive TOP. More 
recently, Quinn (2015) finds that earnings management significantly declines in firms 
that adopt an executive TOP, relative to a propensity score-matched control sample. 
Bhagat and Tookes (2012) (“BT”) is the only other study to empirically examine director 
SORs. Using a two-year sample of firms in the S&P 500, BT find that required director 
stock ownership has no association with future firm performance, but voluntary director 
ownership is positively associated with one-year ahead return on assets. These results 
confirm prior literature on the beneficial effects of director stock ownership; yet provide 
no evidence of benefits associated with director SORs. 
This study differs from BT in three important aspects. First, BT assume that a 
director SOR reflects optimal ownership levels, based on Demsetz’s (1983) argument 
that observed managerial ownership reflects equilibrium outcomes. While BT 
acknowledge ownership requirements may reflect a ‘minimum’ level, they reject this 
argument since firms allow directors several years to accumulate ‘required’ holdings. In 
contrast, I provide evidence that many director SORs are not optimal and are instead set 
at minimum levels that do not require directors to acquire additional stock ownership. 
Second, I identify a much larger and broader sample of firms with a director SOR. BT’s 
sample includes firms that voluntarily disclose the presence of a director SOR in 2003 
and 2005, prior to regulations mandating disclosure. In contrast, I examine a broad 
sample of firms that adopt a director SOR over a period of 15 years, providing a more 
complete view of firms that adopt a director SOR. Third, while BT focus on firm 
performance, I examine whether the adoption of a director SOR improves board 
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performance. Finally, I extend BT’s study of the determinants of a director SOR to 
include director-level and firm-level characteristics, and provide initial evidence of the 
determinants of a substantial or symbolic director SOR. 
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Determinants of Director SOR Adoption 
I draw on prior research on the determinants of firms’ adoption of an executive 
SOR and other governance requirements to develop my hypotheses. Core and Larcker 
(2002) find that firms are more likely to adopt executive TOPs when shareholders 
recognize that the firm may benefit from improved board monitoring; thus the board 
uses executive TOPs as a method to “move the firm to a more appropriate governance 
structure” (Core and Larcker, 2002). Core and Larcker (2002) identify firms with lower 
than industry-average stock returns and low managerial ownership as firms that are 
likely to need improved board monitoring. I similarly predict that, if a firm has low 
outside director ownership or poor prior stock return performance, shareholders may 
infer that the level of outside director equity is insufficient to motivate effective board 
monitoring of the firm’s performance and subsequently adopt a director SOR in order to 
alleviate this concern  
 H1a: As financial performance deteriorates, firms are more likely to 
adopt a director SOR. 
Independent directors often have less information about the firm than inside 
board members, resulting in increased costs to provide monitoring (e.g., Berle and 
Means, 1991; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993). Further, independent directors 
typically own fewer shares in the firm than inside directors. One concern with adding 
outside directors to the board is that outside directors have less company-specific 
knowledge; therefore, the effort required to gather and obtain information relevant to 
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monitoring will be greater than the benefits of monitoring. Thus, outside directors will 
not put forth as much monitoring effort without additional incentives. Consequently, I 
predict that firms with higher outside board membership and lower outside director 
ownership will be more likely to adopt a director SOR.  
 H1b: As outside director ownership decreases, firms are more likely to 
adopt a director SOR. 
 H1c: As the percentage of outside directors increases, firms are more 
likely to adopt a director SOR. 
While the board of directors is important in monitoring the firm, external parties 
can also provide monitoring. Firms with other sources of external monitors may not feel 
the need to adopt director SORs to align director and shareholders’ interests. Therefore, I 
expect that firms with greater institutional ownership will be less likely to adopt a 
director SOR. 
 H1d: As institutional ownership increases, firms are less likely to adopt 
a director SOR. 
Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) show that when the cost of acquiring 
information is low, monitoring performance increases when outsiders are added to the 
board, but when the cost of acquiring information is high, monitoring performance 
deteriorates when outsiders are added to the board. If the cost of acquiring information is 
low for directors, then outside directors will be more likely to adequately monitor 
without the need to increase financial incentives. Therefore, I predict that firms with a 
more transparent information environment are less likely to adopt director SORs. 
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 H1e: As the transparency of the information environment increases, 
firms are less likely to adopt a director SOR. 
3.2 Consequences of Director SOR Adoption 
Because director stock ownership is generally considered to be beneficial in 
aligning director incentives, requiring a minimum amount of director stock ownership 
should encourage stock ownership amongst independent directors, and subsequently 
enhance the monitoring activities of the board.11 I examine the association between the 
adoption of a director SOR and three types of monitoring activities performed by the 
board: financial reporting monitoring, CEO performance monitoring and CEO 
compensation monitoring. 
Financial Reporting Monitoring 
The board of directors’ audit committee is responsible for monitoring the 
transparency and accuracy of the firm’s financial reporting and internal controls. Prior 
research documents that outside director ownership is negatively associated with 
financial statement irregularities (Beasley, 1996). Beasley (1996) finds that as outside 
                                                 
11 I make the assumption that the adoption of a director SOR causes directors’ incentive alignment 
predominantly through financial alignment. However, it is possible that the adoption of a director SOR 
induces alignment by providing a signal to directors of which behaviors are valued. Adams and Ferreira 
(2008) find that directors are less likely to have attendance problems at board meetings when board 
meeting fees are higher. Board meeting fees are, on average, about $1,000 per meeting which is a small 
fraction of the total wealth of a director. While the results of their study appear to show that even very 
small financial rewards can incentivize directors, Adams and Ferreira (2008) also suggest it is possible that 
a shift in more performance-based compensation signals to directors that more attention to board meeting 
attendance is desired. The two effects, financial incentive alignment or signaling, are difficult to 
disentangle. In our case, even if directors are not incentivized by the requirement of additional ownership, 
the adoption of a director SOR may signal to directors that more attention to shareholders’ interests is 
desired; therefore directors may react to the signal in the adoption of a director SOR, in addition to or 
instead of the financial incentive. 
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director ownership increases, the likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases. 
Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer, and Khanin (2008) find that firms are more likely to have 
restatements when managers have lower stock ownership. However, it is not necessarily 
clear whether the directors monitor more because of their ownership or whether directors 
hold more stock because they feel more secure in the financial reporting.  
Further, Archambeault et al. (2008) show that long-term incentive compensation 
for board members is associated with an increased likelihood of accounting restatements. 
They find that there is a higher incidence of restatements when audit committee 
members are granted short-term or long-term stock options. Therefore it is also possible 
that requiring director stock ownership could cause directors to become more focused on 
short-term results. 
I expect that outside directors in firms with a substantial director stock ownership 
requirement should be incentivized to provide more effective financial reporting 
oversight. This increased effort and attention to monitoring should lead to a reduction in 
the likelihood of a financial statement irregularity. 
 H2a: Subsequent to adoption, firms with a director SOR are less likely 
to experience a financial irregularity. 
In a study on executive TOPs, Quinn (2015) finds evidence of a reduction in 
earnings management for firms adopting executive ownership plans that require at least 
one executive to increase ownership, yet does not find any evidence of a similar 
reduction for firms adopting executive TOPs that do not require an ownership increase. 
This result suggests that a director SOR may similarly be more effective if the policy 
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requires an increase in director ownership. Further, Barton and Wiseman (2015) express 
concern that director SORs are not material enough to impact director incentives.12 In 
order for a director SOR to be effective, it is likely that the ownership must be 
compelling and material. Thus, I expect that the effectiveness of a director SOR on 
board monitoring performance may vary based on the extent to which the requirement is 
substantial (i.e., compelling and material).  
 H2b: Firms adopting a substantial director SOR are less likely to 
experience a financial irregularity. 
CEO Performance Monitoring 
The board of directors’ compensation committee is responsible for monitoring and 
reviewing the performance of the CEO. An important part of the board monitoring process 
is the replacement of the CEO when the firm is performing poorly. Prior research has 
shown that firms with high outside director ownership more quickly replace poorly-
performing CEOs. For example, Bhagat et al. (1999) finds that directors with substantial 
ownership are more quick to replace CEOs and Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011) find that 
firms with higher independent director ownership are more likely to dismiss their CEOs 
early, asserting that “boards with strong incentives are more likely to be proactive and act 
on their private information about the CEO than boards with poor incentives.” p1. 
Because a substantial director SOR should increase directors’ ownership in their 
firms, board of directors that have a substantial director SOR should be incentivized to 
                                                 
12 Barton and Wiseman (2015) advocate for the use of a “material” director SOR, even as high as ten 
percent of each individual director’s personal net worth. 
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monitor the performance of the CEO and actively terminate the CEO if performance is not 
up to par. This increased effort and attention to monitoring should lead boards with a 
substantial director SOR to more quickly terminate CEOs of poorly performing firms. 
Thus my third hypothesis is stated as follows:  
 H3a: Subsequent to adoption, firms with a director SOR will have 
greater CEO performance-turnover sensitivity. 
 H3b: Firms adopting a substantial director SOR have greater CEO 
performance-turnover sensitivity. 
CEO Compensation Monitoring 
The board of directors’ compensation committee is also responsible for 
determining CEO pay. Agency theory suggests that incentive pay aligns the interests of 
executives and shareholders; thus by linking executive compensation to firm performance, 
incentive pay is expected to motivate executives to create long-term shareholder value 
(e.g., Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Although the CEO 
compensation plan is determined by the board of directors, prior research has shown that 
weak boards with strong CEOs may set compensation packages that are not linked to 
performance and therefore not in the best interest of shareholders (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009).13  
                                                 
13 Interestingly, Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) model a situation in which board ownership may 
negate the positive effects of board independence, proposing that higher equity ownership for the board may 
actually lead to higher equity awards for managers (CEOs), without regard to performance. 
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CEO compensation monitoring requires accurate information about the CEO’s 
ability and effort (Boyd, 1994; Kim, Mauldin, and Patro, 2014). This information may be 
difficult for an outside director to acquire. If director stock ownership requirements work 
to align directors’ incentives with shareholders’ interests, then I expect that boards with 
such requirements put forth more effort in gathering information that will enable better 
CEO compensation monitoring.  
 H4a: Subsequent to adoption, firms with a director SOR will have lower 
excess CEO compensation. 
 H4b: Firms adopting a substantial director SOR have lower CEO 
excess compensation. 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Determinants of Director SOR Adoption 
I use the following logistic regression model to assess the extent to which 
existing board and firm-level characteristics are associated with a board’s decision to 
adopt a director SOR:  
Prob (Adoptt = 1) = β0 + β1 ROAt-1 + β2 Returnst-1  
+ β3 Board outside ownership pctt-1 + β4 Board outside director pctt-1 
+ β5 Institutional ownership pctt-1 + β6 Analyst followingt-1 
+ β7 Guidance providert-1 + β8 Board sizet-1 + β9 Board tenuret-1 
+ β10 Busy board pctt-1 + β11 CEO ownership pctt-1 + β12 Growth firmt-1 
+ β13 Std dev returnst-1 + β14 Firm aget-1 + β15 Firm sizet-1  
+ Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε (1), 
 
where the dependent variable, Adoptt, is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-year 
observations when the firm initially adopts a director SOR; and zero otherwise. The 
independent variables in Equation (1) are measured in the year t-1. The model is 
estimated with fixed effects for year and industry and robust standard errors. 
As indicated in Hypothesis 1a and 1b, I expect that, all else being equal, firms 
with poor financial performance and low director ownership will be more likely to adopt 
a director SOR. I measure firm performance in two ways, ROA and Returns, and expect 
a negative coefficient on β1 and β2, where ROA is defined as net income divided by 
assets and Returns is defined as the prior 12-month cumulative stock return. I measure 
director ownership, Board outside ownership pct as the percentage of ownership held by 
the median outside director and expect a negative coefficient on β3. Additionally, as per 
Hypothesis 1c, I expect that firms with more outside directors will be more likely to 
 21 
 
adopt a director SOR. I measure Board outside pct as the percentage of the board that are 
identified as outside board members and expect a negative coefficient on β4. 
Hypothesis 1d predicts that firms with greater institutional ownership are less 
likely to adopt a director SOR. I measure Institutional ownership pct as the percentage of 
stock held by institutional owners as defined by Thomson Reuters and expect a negative 
coefficient on β5. Hypothesis 1e predicts that firms with more transparent information 
environments will be less likely to require director SOR, as greater information 
asymmetry requires more effort by the director to effectively monitor. I include two 
variables, Analyst following and Guidance provider, to proxy for the information 
environment of the firm. I measure Analyst following as the number of analysts that 
provided an EPS estimate for the firm in the prior year; Guidance provider is an 
indicator variable set to one if the firm provided either annual or quarterly EPS guidance 
in the prior year and zero otherwise. As both of these variables indicate a more 
transparent information environment, I expect a negative coefficient on both β6 and β7. 
I include additional board-level characteristics as control measures. Board size is 
defined as the number of total directors on the board; Board tenure is defined as the 
average tenure of the outside directors on the board; and Busy board pct is defined as the 
percentage of outside directors that sit on three or more boards. Larger boards may need 
to increase outside director ownership in order to incentivize directors. Longer-tenured 
board members have a tendency to become entrenched; thus firms with longer board 
tenure may also be more likely to adopt director SOR in order to ensure interest 
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alignment. Board members who sit on multiple boards may be too busy to pay attention 
to the desires of shareholders or may be more willing to rely on management. 
Finally, I include firm level characteristics as controls. CEO ownership pct is the 
percentage of stock held by the CEO; Growth firm is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm’s book-to-market ratio is higher than the median for the year; Std dev returns is 
defined as the standard deviation of the prior 12 months stock price return; Firm size is 
defined as the natural log of assets and Firm age is the age of the firm according to 
Compustat. 
4.2 Consequences of Director SOR Adoption 
To examine the consequences of director SOR adoption, I use a difference-in-
difference design to capture the effect of the change from the pre- to the post- period for 
treatment and control firms. Adoptert is an indicator variable equal to one for all 
observations of treatment firms (i.e., firms that adopt a director SOR) and zero for all 
observations of control firms (i.e., firms that do not adopt a director SOR). Postt is an 
indicator variable equal to one for firm-year observations including and after the match 
year and zero for firm-years prior to the match year. The event year is the year of 
director SOR adoption for treatment firms (Adopter=1), and a randomly selected year 
for each available control firm (Adopter=0). 
Additionally, I employ a propensity score matching approach to create a matched 
sample of firms with a director SOR (treatment) and firms without a director SOR 
(control). I base the propensity score matching model on several factors affecting the 
decision to have a director SOR. Estimation of a causal effect in observational studies 
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may be biased because firms choose ownership requirements endogenously. Therefore, 
any differences in outcome may be attributed to factors that affect the likelihood of 
choosing to have a director SOR rather than the actual SOR. Propensity score matching 
addresses sample selection bias by creating a matched sample of adopting and non-
adopting firms based on their propensity to have a director SOR (Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
I estimate propensity scores using a logistic regression that includes board and 
firm factors that may affect the decision to use a director SOR. I match firms with a 
director SOR (treatment) to firms without a director SOR (control) with replacement 
based on the closest propensity score match and a caliper width equal to 0.044, which is 
20 percent of the standard deviation of the propensity score. Because this matching 
approach depends on the order of observations, I randomize the order prior to propensity 
score matching. See Appendix B for the regression results of the propensity score 
matching and Table 3, Panel B for comparisons of the mean and medians of treatment 
and control groups.  
Financial Reporting Monitoring 
To test Hypothesis 2a, I use the following logit regression: 
 Prob (Financial irregularityt+1, t+2) =  β0 + β1 Adoptert + β2 Postt  
+ β3 Adoptert x Postt + Controlst (2) 
 
where Financial irregularityt+1, t+2 is defined as an indicator variable equal to one when a 
firm experiences a financial restatement due to fraud, an SEC investigation, or a board 
initiated investigation according to Audit Analytics; and zero otherwise. I expect a 
negative coefficient on β3, the interaction of Adoptert x Postt, indicating that firms are 
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less likely to have a financial irregularity after the adoption of a director SOR. I include 
controls for Board sizet, Board outside pctt, Busy board pctt, Board tenuret, and Board 
outside ownership pctt. I include return on assets (ROAt) as a measure of firm accounting 
performance and proxy for growth opportunities using the book-to-market ratio (BTMt) 
and change in sales (Sales growtht). I include an indicator for whether the firm was 
involved in M&A activity during the previous fiscal year (M&At). All models are 
estimated with fixed effects for year and industry and robust standard errors. 
CEO Performance Monitoring 
To test Hypothesis 3a, I use the following OLS regression of forced CEO 
turnover conditional on firm performance:14  
Forced CEO Turnovert+1 = β0 + β1 Adoptert + β2 Postt + β3 Poor performancet 
+ β4 Adoptert x Postt + β5 Postt x Poor performancet 
+ β6 Adoptert x Postt x Poor performancet  
+ Controlst (3) 
 
where I define Forced CEO turnovert+1 as a change in CEO when the CEO is less than 
65 years old. Poor performancet is a measure of the firm’s financial performance and is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s ROA is less than the industry median ROA 
for that year. I expect to find a positive coefficient on the interaction of Adoptert x Postt 
x Poor performancet (β6 > 0) indicating that firms adopting a director SOR have greater 
CEO performance-turnover sensitivity.  
                                                 
14 In this regression the dependent variable is dichotomous; however, given the problems of trying to 
interpret interaction terms in nonlinear models, as well as the problems with including fixed effects, I 
estimate this specification using OLS techniques, consistent with recent research (Atanassov, 2013; 
Cornelli, Kominek, and Ljungqvist, 2013; Becker and Milbourn, 2011). 
 25 
 
I include controls for several board characteristics because prior studies find that 
the CEO performance-turnover sensitivity increases when there are more outsiders on 
the board (Weisbach, 1988) and decreases with greater presence of busy directors on the 
board (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) and with larger board size (Faleye, 2004). 
Additionally, I include a control for firm size as prior studies find that turnover increases 
as the size of the firm increases (e.g., Huson, Parrino and Starks, 2001). I measure Board 
sizet, Board outside pctt, Board outside ownership pctt, Board tenuret, Busy board pctt, 
and Firm sizet as defined in Equation (1). 
CEO Compensation Monitoring 
To test Hypothesis 4a, I use the following OLS regression: 
 Excess compensationt+1 =  β0 + β1 Adoptert + β2 Postt + β3 Adoptert x Postt  
+ Controlst (4) 
 
where Excess compensationt+1 is used to capture CEOs’ potential rent extraction via 
compensation that is above their economic wage (Core et al., 1999). Following Kim et 
al. (2014), I estimate excess CEO compensation as residuals from regressions of 
expected total, cash and equity compensation.15 The estimation results are reported in 
Appendix C. I expect a negative coefficient on β3, the interaction of Adoptert x Postt, 
indicating that firms pay less in excess CEO compensation after the adoption of a 
director SOR. I include controls for Board sizet, Board outside pctt, Busy board pctt, 
                                                 
15 Following Kim et al. (2014), I estimate compensation residuals using the natural log of total 
compensation, cash compensation and equity compensation. Because Incentive Lab uses equity 
compensation as reported by firms in their proxy statements, the passage of SFAS 123R creates a 
discontinuity in the reported values of equity-based compensation during my sample period. To account 
for this discontinuity and consistent with Kim et al. (2014), I separately estimate excess compensation 
regressions for the pre-SFAS 123R and the SFAS 123R periods. See Appendix C for regressions. 
 26 
 
Board tenuret, and Board outside ownership pctt. All models are estimated with fixed 
effects for year and industry and robust standard errors. 
4.3 Substantial and Symbolic Director SOR Adoption 
My next set of tests examine whether the association between the adoption of a 
director SOR and board monitoring performance varies based on the whether the 
director SOR is compelling and material. To identify adoptions of compelling director 
SORs, I first compare the required director ownership in the year of adoption to the ex-
ante director ownership in the year prior to adoption for each individual director. I then 
determine the percentage of directors that met or exceeded the director SOR in the year 
prior to adoption. I classify a firm as a Compelling adopter if less than 75 percent of the 
directors on the board met the ownership requirement in the year prior to adoption. 
Conversely, I classify ownership requirements as Non-compelling adopter if more than 
75 percent of the directors on the board met the ownership requirement in the year prior 
to adoption.16  
To identify adoptions of material director SORs, I classify each adopting firm as 
either robust, standard or sub-standard according to ISS (2014). The ISS criterion is 
based on the amount of required ownership as a multiple of annual director retainer. A 
director SOR is considered robust if the required ownership is at least five times the 
annual director retainer; standard if the required ownership is at least three times the 
                                                 
16 In additional tests, I also use 50 percent as a threshold for identifying compelling adopters and 
alternatively, use a continuous variable Met prior pct. My results are not robust to these alternative 
measures. This could be due to the high proportion of firms (53 percent) in which more than 75 percent of 
the directors meet the ownership requirement in the year prior to adoption. 
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annual director retainer but less than five times the annual director retainer; and sub-
standard if the required ownership is less than three times the annual director retainer. 
I include indicator variables for Compelling adopters and Non-compelling 
adopters in Equations 2, 3 and 4 and interact these variables with an indicator variable 
for Postt. I then further separate compelling adopters into three categories based on the 
materiality of the ownership requirement: Compelling robust adopters; Compelling 
standard adopters; and Compelling sub-standard adopters. 
For Hypothesis 2b, I expect that the coefficient on the interaction of Compelling 
adoptert x Postt will be significantly less than the coefficient on the interaction of Non-
compelling adoptert x Postt, indicating that compelling adopters will be less likely to 
experience a financial irregularity after adoption than non-compelling adopters. I expect 
to find a positive coefficient on the interaction of Substantial Adoptert x Postt x Poor 
Performancet (β4 > 0), indicating that firms adopting a compelling director SOR have 
greater CEO performance-turnover sensitivity. Further, I expect that the coefficient on 
the interaction of Substantial Adoptert x Postt x Poor Performancet will be significantly 
more than the coefficient on the interaction of Symbolic Adoptert x Postt x Poor 
Performancet (β4 > β8), indicating that compelling adopters will have greater CEO 
performance-turnover sensitivity after adoption than non-compelling adopters. 
For Hypothesis 3b, I expect to find a positive coefficient on the interaction term 
of Compelling adoptert x Postt x Poor performancet. I also expect a significant 
difference between coefficients on Compelling adoptert x Postt x Poor performancet and 
Non-compelling adopters x Postt x Poor performancet. I expect to find a positive 
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coefficient on the interaction of Compelling, Robust Adoptert x Postt x Poor 
Performancet, indicating that firms adopting a compelling and robust director SOR have 
greater CEO performance-turnover sensitivity. Further, I expect that the coefficient on 
the interaction of Compelling Robust Adoptert x Postt x Poor Performancet will be 
significantly more than the coefficients on the interaction of Non- Compelling Adoptert x 
Postt x Poor Performancet, and the interaction of Compelling, Sub-standard Adoptert x 
Postt x Poor Performancet, indicating that compelling robust adopters will have greater 
CEO performance-turnover sensitivity after adoption than non-compelling adopters and 
compelling sub-standard adopters. 
For Hypothesis 4b, I expect to find a negative coefficient on the interaction term 
of Compelling adoptert x Postt. I also expect to a significant difference between 
coefficients on Compelling adoptert x Postt and Non-compelling adopters x Postt. 
Further, I expect that the coefficient on the interaction of Substantial Adoptert x Postt 
will be significantly more than the coefficient on the interaction of Symbolic Adoptert x 
Postt (β4 > β8), indicating that compelling adopters will have less excess CEO 
compensation after adoption than non-compelling adopters. 
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5. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 1, Panel A summarizes the sample selection. I start with 21,387 firm-year 
observations (1,048 adopting firms) from the intersection of Incentive Lab and 
Compustat from 1998 to 2013. I exclude 611 firm-year observations (13 adopting firms) 
missing data from Compustat; 1,319 observations (77 adopting firms) missing return 
data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database; 3,618 
observations (168 adopting firms) missing board or CEO data from Incentive Lab and 
ExecuComp and 2,543 observations (76 adopting firms) missing data from one year lag 
and leads. The full sample includes 13,296 firm year observations, including 714 
observations of director SOR adoption. After propensity-score matching, the sample 
includes 8,418 firm year observations and 481 adopting firms. I obtain irregularity data 
from Audit Analytics and CEO turnover data from Incentive Lab. Table 1, Panel B 
summarizes observations by firm-year. The number of firm observations per year ranges 
from 686 to 1,002 with an average of 886 firms per year. 
Figure 1 shows the trend in the number of firms utilizing a director SOR over the 
past fifteen years, as well as the number of firms adopting a director SOR each year.17 
                                                 
17To identify the year of director SOR adoption, I use Incentive Lab holding requirements data. I classify a 
firm’s initial year with a director SOR as the year of adoption.  Since Incentive Lab provides detail on 
director SORs for years ending after December 15, 2006, I hand collect the year of adoption for 516 firms 
with a director SOR in fiscal year 2006. I examine prior year’s proxy statements to identify ownership 
requirements previously disclosed. I use the search terms: “ownership guidelines”, “ownership 
requirements”, “ownership policy” and “target ownership”, as well as simply “ownership”. I document 
that 389 firms (75.4 percent) voluntarily disclose the presence of a director SOR in years prior to 2006; 78  
firms (15.1 percent) explicitly state 2006 as the adoption year; and 49 firms (9.5 percent) neither disclose 
the presence of a director SOR in a prior year’s proxy statement nor explicitly state the adoption year. As 
there is little reason to believe firms would not disclose the presence of a director SOR, I assume the 
adoption year is the year in which the director SOR is first disclosed. 
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The dark portions of the bars indicate the number of firms continuing the use of a 
director SOR while the light portions indicate the number of firms adopting a director 
SOR in the period. Only 39 (2 percent) of the sample firms had a director SOR in 1998, 
while 893 (65 percent) had a director SOR in 2013. It is interesting to note that the first 
significant increase in director SORs can be seen in 2003, shortly after the 
implementation of board independence requirements by the NYSE and SOX, and 
continues through 2007, after the implementation of SEC regulations mandating the 
disclosure of director SORs. In untabulated results, I find that the average dollar value of 
required ownership has also risen from $157,055 in 1998 to $391,250 in 2013.18 
For firms adopting a director SOR, I determine the dollar value of the director 
SOR in the year of adoption. Table 2, Panel A (Panel B) reports the number of firms in 
the full (propensity-score matched) sample that adopt a director SOR in the form of a 
multiple of retainer, shares, dollar value or combination. For adopting firms that use 
multiple of retainer approach (n=454), I calculate the dollar value requirement as the 
required multiple times the director’s annual retainer.19 For adopting firms that use a 
fixed number of shares approach (n=152), I calculate the dollar value requirement as the 
number of shares required multiplied by the stock price at the end of the fiscal year. For 
adopting firms that use a dollar value approach (n=81), the requirement is simply the 
                                                 
18 Morningstar Inc. has the highest director SOR in my sample. According to the Morningstar Inc.’s 2011 
proxy statement, its directors are required to hold “shares with a value of $5,000,000 or generally 
speaking, a number of Morningstar shares and share equivalents that is greater than or equal to the sum of 
12.5 percent of the total number of exercisable stock options and 25 percent of the total number of vested 
restricted stock units that he or she has been granted.” (p.21). 
19 I use the individual director’s retainer (cash fees), if provided by Incentive Lab; otherwise, I use the 
average director retainer provided by ExecuComp. 
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dollar value as specified in the proxy statement. For adopting firms that use a 
combination of methods (n=27), I use the lesser of the values as calculated above, unless 
otherwise specified in the proxy statement. Table 2 also reports the actual outside 
director ownership in the year of adoption. I determine actual dollar value ownership 
using the reported number of shares held by each director multiplied by the share price at 
the close of the fiscal year. 20 
As shown in Table 2, on average, the dollar value of required director stock 
ownership is lower than the actual dollar value of director stock ownership. In Panel A, 
the mean (median) retainer multiple is 3.88X (4.00X) and the mean (median) ownership 
requirement is $244,600 ($200,000); yet the mean (median) of actual outside director 
ownership for adopting firms is $2,030,200 ($993,500). This data shows that average 
director ownership is more than ten times greater than the ownership requirement, 
suggesting that director SORs may not be compelling for directors. Similar results are 
shown in Panel B using the propensity-score matched sample. 
To investigate further whether director SORs are compelling, Figure 2 shows the 
average director SOR for adopting firms in each year, as well as the minimum and 
median actual director stock ownership for adopting firms. The median director owns 
significantly more than required in the year of adoption, while the minimum director 
owns slightly more than required in all years except 2002. 
                                                 
20 Stock ownership of each board member is disclosed in the annual proxy statement and provided by 
Incentive Lab. While there is variation in whether firms consider deferred shares or unvested options in 
meeting the director SOR requirement; for the purposes of these tests, I have included all shares reported 
as beneficially owned in Incentive Lab. 
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Table 3, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for adopting firms (treatment) and 
firms that do not adopt a director SOR in my sample (controls). The descriptive statistics 
indicate that firms adopting a director SOR have larger boards with a higher percentage 
of outside directors; directors of firms with a director SOR tend to have longer tenure 
and are more likely to sit on three or more other boards. Firms with a director SOR have 
less CEO ownership and greater institutional ownership, as well as a larger analyst 
following. These firms also tend to be larger and older than firms not adopting a director 
SOR. 
Tests of differences in the means and medians indicate the treatment and control 
firms have significant differences. Table 3, Panel A shows significant differences in the 
means and medians across all variables, with the exception of mean Returns. Table 3, 
Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the propensity score-matched firms. Matching 
on propensity score removes much of the bias between the adopting and non-adopting 
sample. However, the means (medians) of five (six) of the fifteen variables are 
statistically different after propensity-score matching; therefore, in further tests I include 
these variables to control for any residual bias.21 
                                                 
21 I examine the covariate balance between the treatment firms and control firms and test whether the 
systematic differences in the full sample are reduced in the propensity score-matched sample. 
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6. RESULTS 
6.1 Determinants of Director SOR Adoption 
To test Hypothesis 1a-e, I examine the likelihood of a firm adopting a director 
SOR. Table 4, Column 1 presents results from the logistic model specified in Equation 
(1).22 For H1a, I expect to find a negative coefficient on variables that proxy for firm 
performance (ROAt-1 and Returns t-1), indicating that a firm is more likely to adopt a 
director SOR when performance has been lower. However, the coefficients on both 
ROAt-1 (β1 = 0.027, p-value > 0.10) and Returns t-1 (β2 = 0.257, p-value > 0.10) are 
positive but not significant. In tests of H1b and H1c, I document a negative and 
significant coefficient on Board outside ownership pctt-1 (β3 = -0.668, p-value < 0.01) 
and positive and significant coefficient on Board outside director pct (β4 = 1.154, p-
value < 0.05), as expected. These results indicate that boards with lower outside director 
ownership and a higher percentage of outsiders on the board are more likely to adopt a 
director SOR. 
For H1d, I expect that institutional ownership may be seen as a substitute for 
board monitoring; thus, I expect a negative coefficient on Institutional ownership pct t-1. 
However, I find a positive and significant coefficient on Institutional ownership pct t-1 
(β5 = 0.546, p-value < 0.05), indicating that as institutional ownership increases, firms 
are more likely to adopt a director SOR, suggesting that institutional ownership serves a 
complement to board monitoring. 
                                                 
22 In untabulated results, I also run Equation (1) as an OLS regression and find consistent results across all 
hypotheses, including control variables. 
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For H1e, I expect to find a negative coefficient on variables that proxy for the 
transparency of a firm’s information environment performance (Analyst followingt-1 and 
Guidance providert-1), indicating that a firm is less likely to adopt a director SOR when 
directors’ already have sufficient information to monitor. However, I find a positive and 
significant coefficient on Analyst followingt-1 (β6 = 0.047, p-value < 0.01) and a positive 
but insignificant coefficient on Guidance providert-1 (β7 = 0.287, p-value > 0.10). This 
result indicates that firms with a large analyst following are more likely to adopt a 
director SOR than firms with a small analyst following. 
In addition, I find that the coefficients on CEO ownership pct (β11 = -4.549, p-
value < 0.01) and Std deviation of returns (β13 = -17.576, p-value < 0.05) are negative 
and significant, indicating that as CEO ownership decreases and as the volatility of the 
stock price decreases, firms are more likely to adopt a director SOR. Finally, the 
coefficients on Growth firms (β12 = 0.311, p-value < 0.10) and Firm age (β14 = 0.023, p-
value < 0.01) are positive and significant, indicating that a growth firm is more likely to 
adopt a director SOR yet older firms are also more likely to adopt a director SOR.23 
Other board and firm characteristics such as Board sizet-1 (β8 = 0.019, p-value > 
0.10), Board tenuret-1 (β9 = 0.010, p-value > 0.10), Busy board pctt-1 (β10 = -0.447, p-
value > 0.10) and Firm sizet-1 (β15 = 0.133, p-value > 0.10) are not significantly 
associated with the likelihood of adopting a director SOR. 
                                                 
23 In robustness tests, I also run Equations (1) including PastIRRt-1 as an independent variable. PastIRRt-1 
is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has had a financial irregularity in any of the prior three 
years; otherwise zero. The coefficient on this variable is positive but not significant, indicating that the 
occurrence of a financial irregularity does not influence a firm’s likelihood of adopting a director SOR. 
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Alternative Methods of Modeling Director SOR Adoption 
An alternative method for analyzing the determinants of director SOR adoption is 
to use a hazard regression. In the hazard regression, adoption of a director SOR is 
modeled as the ‘‘failure’’ event, (i.e., the dependent variable is the time to director SOR 
adoption.) The hazard regression estimates the impact of board and firm characteristics 
on adoption, accounting for the relative timing of that adoption. I use the first year of the 
sample (1998) as my starting year and calculate T as the ‘‘survival’’ time, (i.e., the 
number of years until the firm adopts a director SOR.)24 Thus, T=1 if a firm adopts a 
director SOR in 1998, T=2 if adoption occurs in 1999, and so on. For firms that do not 
adopt by 2013, T is set to 15 for year 2013 and the dependent variable is treated as 
censored.  
Table 4, Column 2 reports the beta coefficients for the results of a hazard model. 
The results are consistent with logistic regression with one exception. I find a positive 
and significant coefficient on Returnst-1 (β2 = 0.159, p-value < 0.05) in the hazard model, 
indicating that as a firm’s stock market return increases, so does the likelihood of 
adopting a director SOR. 
6.2 Consequences of Director SOR Adoption 
Financial Reporting Monitoring 
To test Hypothesis 2a, I examine the likelihood of financial irregularities 
following the adoption a director SOR. Table 5, Panel A presents logistic regression 
                                                 
24 If the firm is incorporated after 1998, then I use the year of incorporation as the start date. 
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results from the models specified in Equation (2). Panel A, Column 1 presents the 
coefficients from the regression using the full sample, or all available firm years for 
treatment and control firms with at least three consecutive firm-year observations (t-1 to 
t+1) while Column 2 presents the coefficient from the regression using the propensity 
score-matched sample with at least three consecutive firm-year observations (t-1 to t+1). 
In Table 5, Panel A, Column 1, I find a negative and marginally significant coefficient 
for the interaction term of Adoptert x Postt (β4 = -0.184, p-value< 0.10), indicating that 
firms with a director SOR are less likely to experience a financial irregularity in the 
years after adoption. This result also holds when using the smaller, propensity score 
matched sample in Column 2 (β4 = -0.237, p-value< 0.10). This result supports H2a that 
predicts firms will have a lower likelihood of financial irregularities after adopting a 
director SOR compared to firms that do not adopt a director SOR. 
To test Hypothesis 2b, I examine whether the effect of director SOR on board 
monitoring is stronger for compelling ownership requirements as compared to non-
compelling ownership requirements. Table 5, Panel B presents logistic regression results 
from the models specified in Equation (2b). For Panel B, Column 1a and 1b present the 
coefficients from the regression using the full sample, or all available firm years for 
treatment and control firms with at least three consecutive firm-year observations (t-1 to 
t+1) while Columns 2a and 2b present the coefficients from the regression using the 
propensity score-matched sample with at least three consecutive firm-year observations 
(t-1 to t+1). In Table 5, Panel B, Columns 1a and 2a, I find a negative and significant 
coefficient for the interaction term of Compelling Adoptert x Postt (β8 = -0.297, p-value< 
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0.05), indicating that firms that adopt a compelling director SOR are less likely to 
experience a financial irregularity in the two years after adoption than firms that do not 
adopt a director SOR. Additionally, I find that the coefficient on the interaction term 
Compelling Adoptert x Postt is significantly less than the coefficient on the interaction 
term of Non-compelling Adoptert x Postt (β8 < β7, χ2 = 3.36, p-value< 0.10), indicating 
that firms adopting compelling director SORs are less likely to have a financial 
irregularity than even firms that adopt non-compelling director SOR. These results also 
hold when using the smaller, propensity-score match sample in Column 2a (β8 = -0.371, 
p-value < 0.05) and (β8 < β7, χ2 = 3.04, p-value < 0.10).   
In Table 5, Panel B, Columns 1b and 2b, I further investigate whether the effect 
of director SOR on board monitoring is stronger for compelling ownership requirements, 
conditional on whether the amount is material. The coefficients on the interaction terms 
of Compelling, Robust Adoptert x Postt (β11 = -0.496, p-value < 0.01) and Compelling, 
Standard Adoptert x Postt (β10 = -0.268, p-value < 0.01) are both negative and 
significant, indicating that firms with a compelling and material director SOR are less 
likely to experience a financial irregularity in the two years after adoption. However, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms of Compelling, Sub-standard Adoptert x Postt (β9 =  
-0.039, p-value >0.10) and Non-Compelling, Adoptert x Postt (β7 = 0.095, p-value > 
0.10) are both insignificant. Moreover, using an Wald χ2 test, the coefficient on 
Compelling, Robust Adoptert x Postt is statistically significantly less than the coefficients 
on Non-Compelling Adoptert x Postt (β9 < β6, χ2 = 6.92, p-value < 0.01) and Compelling, 
Symbolic Adoptert x Postt (β9 < β7, χ2 = 4.75, p-value < 0.05). These results also hold 
 38 
 
when using the propensity-score match sample in Column 2a (β9 < β6, χ2 = 2.94, p-value 
< 0.05) and (β9 < β7, χ2 = 4.02, p-value < 0.05). 
CEO Performance Monitoring 
To test Hypothesis 3a, I examine the likelihood of CEO performance-turnover 
sensitivity following the adoption a director SOR. Table 6, Panel A presents OLS 
regression results from the models specified in Equation (3). Panel A, Column 1 presents 
the coefficients from the regression using the full sample, or all available firm years for 
treatment and control firms with at least three consecutive firm-year observations (t-1 to 
t+1) while Column 2 presents the coefficient from the regression using the propensity 
score-matched sample with at least three consecutive firm-year observations (t-1 to t+1). 
In Table 6, Panel A, Column 1, I find a positive and insignificant coefficient for the 
three-way interaction term of Adoptert x Postt x Poor performancet (β7 = 0.002, p-value 
> 0.10) using the full sample and a negative but still insignificant coefficient (β7 = -
0.005, p-value > 0.10) using the propensity-score match sample.  
To test Hypothesis 3b, I examine the association between the adoption of a 
compelling director SOR and CEO performance-turnover sensitivity. In Table 5, Panel 
B, Columns 1a and 2a, the coefficients for the interaction term of Adoptert x Postt x Poor 
performancet are not significant (Column 1a: β21 = -0.002, p-value > 0.10; Column 2a: 
β3 = -0.005, p-value > 0.10). Further, using an F-test on the difference between the 
coefficients on the three way interaction of Compelling Adoptert x Postt x Poor 
Performancet (β21) and Non-Compelling Adoptert x Postt x Poor Performancet (β20) and 
do not find any evidence that β21 < β20. Further, I find no significant differences in the 
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effect of a compelling director SOR, conditional on the amount of the requirement and 
forced CEO turnover. The coefficients on the interaction terms Compelling, Robust 
Adoptert x Postt x Poor Performancet and Compelling, Standard Adoptert x Postt x Poor 
Performancet are both insignificant in columns 1b and 2b. In conclusion, I find no 
evidence that firms that adopt a director SOR demonstrate improved board monitoring, 
as measured by CEO performance-turnover sensitivity. 
CEO Compensation Monitoring 
To test Hypothesis 4a, I examine the association between the adoption of a 
director SOR and excess CEO compensation. Table 7, Panel A presents OLS regression 
results from the models specified in Equation (4) with CEO total compensation, cash 
compensation and equity compensation as the dependent variables. Panel A, Columns 1-
3 present the coefficients from the regression using the full sample, or all available firm 
years for treatment and control firms with at least three consecutive firm-year 
observations (t-1 to t+1) while Columns 4-6 present the coefficient from the regression 
using the propensity score-match sample with at least three consecutive firm-year 
observations (t-1 to t+1). In Table 7, Panel A, Columns 1-3, I find a positive and 
significant coefficient for the interaction term of Adoptert x Postt (β4 = 0.303, p-value < 
0.01; β4 = 0.172, p-value < 0.05; β4 = 0.836, p-value < 0.05), indicating that firms with a 
director SOR have higher excess CEO compensation after adoption, compared to firms 
without a director SOR. Using the propensity-score match sample, the coefficients on 
the interaction term are consistent for the regressions of excess total compensation 
(Column 4: β4 = 0.275, p-value < 0.01) and excess equity compensation (Column 6: β4 = 
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1.155, p-value < 0.05), but the coefficient on the interaction term for the regression of 
excess cash compensation is no longer significant (Column 5: β4 = 0.109, p-value > 
0.10). This result fails to support H4a and indicates that rather than improving 
compensation monitoring after adoption, the adoption of a director SOR may be 
associated with excess CEO compensation.  
To test Hypothesis 4b, I examine whether the effect of director SOR on board 
compensation monitoring is stronger for compelling ownership requirements as 
compared to non-compelling ownership requirements. Table 7, Panel B presents OLS 
regression results from the models specified in Equation (4b). For Panel B, Columns 1-4 
present the coefficients from the regression using the full sample, or all available firm 
years for treatment and control firms with at least three consecutive firm-year 
observations (t-1 to t+1) while Columns 5-8 present the coefficients from the regression 
using the propensity score-matched sample with at least three consecutive firm-year 
observations (t-1 to t+1). In Table 7, Panel B, Columns 1 and 2, I find a positive and 
significant coefficient for the interaction term of Compelling Adoptert x Postt (Total 
Comp: β8 = 0.287, p-value < 0.01; Equity Comp: β8 = 0.881, p-value < 0.05), indicating 
that firms that adopt a compelling director SOR have more excess CEO compensation 
than firms that do not adopt a director SOR. However, I find that the coefficient on the 
interaction term Compelling Adoptert x Postt is not significantly less than the coefficient 
on the interaction term of Non-compelling Adoptert x Postt (β8 < β7, Total Comp: F-test = 
0.28, p-value > 0.10; Cash Comp: F-test = 0.02, p-value > 0.10), indicating that the a 
compelling director SOR has no incremental effect on board compensation monitoring. 
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These results are confirmed using the propensity-score match sample in Columns 5 and 
6 (Total Comp: β8 = 0.286, p-value < 0.01; Equity Comp: β8 = 1.283, p-value < 0.05) 
and (β8 < β7, Total Comp: F-test = 0.10, p-value > 0.10; Cash Comp: F-test = 0.14, p-
value > 0.10). 
Finally, in Table 7, Panel B, Columns 3 and 4, I further investigate whether the 
effect of director SOR on board monitoring is stronger for compelling ownership 
requirements, conditional on whether the amount is material. The coefficients on the 
interaction terms of Compelling, Robust Adoptert x Postt (Total Comp: β11 = 0.338, p-
value < 0.01; Equity Comp: β11 = 0.1.016, p-value < 0.10) are positive and significant, 
indicating that firms that adopt a compelling and material director SOR have more 
excess CEO compensation than firms that do not adopt a director SOR. However, again I 
find that the coefficient on the interaction term Compelling, Robust Adoptert x Postt is 
not significantly less than the coefficient on the interaction term of Non-compelling, 
Robust Adoptert x Postt (β11 < β7, Total Comp: F-test = 0.04, p-value > 0.10; Cash Comp: 
F-test = 0.14, p-value > 0.10), using either the full sample or the propensity-score match 
sample. 
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7. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
Given that the effect of a director SOR on board monitoring varies for substantial 
and symbolic adopters, it is interesting to consider the choice to adopt a substantial or 
symbolic adoption rather than simply the choice to adopt a director SOR. To do so, I 
create a variable Type of SOR equal to zero if the firm does not adopt a director SOR, 
one if the director SOR is symbolic (either not compelling or compelling sub-standard) 
and equal to two if the director SOR is substantial (either compelling robust, or 
compelling standard.) As I have no particular reason to anticipate such stability in 
factors explaining the choice of director SOR, I use a generalized ordered logit 
regression. This method developed by Fu (1998) is similar to an ordered logit regression, 
but relaxes the proportional odds assumption on the data and produces two sets of 
coefficients that correspond to each cut-point. The first set of coefficients refers to the 
odds that the number of choice of director SOR falls into categories 1 or 2 (symbolic or 
substantial) instead of category 0 (no director SOR). Similarly, the second set refers to 
the odds that the choice of director SOR falls into category 2 instead of 0 or 1. 
The first set of regression coefficients from the generalized ordered logistic 
regression in Table 8 is consistent with the results from the simple logistic regression. 
The second set of regression coefficients in Table 7 show several variables that can 
explain firms' decisions to adopt a substantial director SOR rather than a symbolic 
director SOR. The following variables are negative and significant: Board outside 
director pctt-1 (p-value < 0.10); Board outside ownership pct t-1 (p-value < 0.01); and 
Board tenure t-1 (p-value <0.01). Firm age t-1 is positive and significant (p-value <0.05). 
 43 
 
These results suggest that older firms with more outside directors, lower outside director 
ownership and less experienced directors are more likely to adopt a substantial SOR. In 
summary, the generalized ordered logistic regression provides further enlightenment on 
the distinguishing features of firms that chose to adopt a symbolic or substantial director 
SOR. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
While many firms have been responsive to calls to improve corporate governance 
by implementing a director SOR, wide-spread adoption now warrants further scholarly 
attention. This study examines whether director SORs are effective in aligning director 
and shareholder interests, or alternatively, represent the latest option for corporate 
governance window-dressing. Using a unique sample firms adopting a director SOR 
from 1998 to 2013, I examine whether the adoption of a director SOR is associated with 
improved board monitoring. I show that, on average, firms adopting a director SOR 
exhibit improved monitoring over financial reporting. Not surprisingly, these results are 
driven primarily by firms that adopt a substantial director SOR, rather than a symbolic 
SOR. In contrast, it appears that firms adopting a director SOR exhibit decreased 
compensation monitoring. Additionally, I find no evidence indicating that firms adopting 
a substantial director SOR exhibit greater CEO performance-turnover sensitivity or less 
excess CEO compensation. 
I also find evidence suggesting that firms do not necessarily use the adoption of a 
director SOR as a substitute for other monitoring mechanisms. Results from a 
generalized ordered logistic regression show that firms with other external monitors and 
better information environments are no more likely to adopt a substantial director SOR 
than a symbolic director SOR. However, boards with fewer outside directors, lower 
outside director ownership, and less tenure are more likely to adopt a substantial director 
SOR than a symbolic SOR. 
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This study contributes to the literature on director incentives (e.g., Kumar and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Archambeault, DeZoort and Hermanson, 2008; Yermack, 
2004; Drymiotes and Sivaramakrishnan, 2012) by examining an additional tool that can 
be used to incentivize directors. Additionally, this study contributes to the literature on 
stock ownership requirements (e.g., Core and Larcker, 2002; Quinn, 2015; Bhagat and 
Tookes, 2012) by providing initial evidence that the adoption of a substantial director 
SOR is effective in aligning directors’ incentives with shareholders’ interests. However, 
this study shows that many firms adopt a symbolic director SOR; thus, without 
understanding the variances in adoption of a director SOR, one cannot broadly assume 
that a director SOR has a meaningful impact on director incentives and board monitoring 
performance. 
These findings suggest areas for future research. Research may examine the 
effect of a director SOR on the boards’ advising performance. For example, does 
adoption of director SORs lead to improved board advising (e.g., likelihood and 
frequency of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity, the abnormal market return 
around M&A announcements, or the likelihood that the firm is subject to a hostile 
takeover or activist intervention)? Continued research in this area will be beneficial to 
establish director SORs as a useful tool in addressing agency issue and encouraging 
active monitoring by the board of directors. 
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Name  Definition 
Director SOR = Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has director 
stock ownership requirements in effect as of the last 
day of the firm fiscal year; otherwise zero. 
Adopter = Indicator variable equal to one if the firm adopted a 
director stock ownership requirement (SOR) in the 
current fiscal year; otherwise zero. 
Compelling adopter = Indicator variable equal to one if the firm adopted a 
compelling director SOR (i.e., at least 25 percent of the 
outside directors must increase shareholdings to meet 
the requirement, based on outside director ownership 
in the year prior to adoption); otherwise zero. 
Non-compelling adopter = Indicator variable equal to one if the firm implemented 
a non-compelling director SOR (i.e., less than 25 
percent of the outside directors must increase 
shareholdings to meet the requirement, based on 
outside director ownership in the year prior to 
adoption); otherwise zero. 
Robust adopter = Indicator variable equal to one if the firm implemented 
a robust director SOR (i.e., greater than five times the 
annual director retainer); otherwise zero. 
Standard adopter = Indicator variable equal to one if the firm implemented 
a standard director SOR (i.e., more than three times but 
less than five times the annual director retainer); 
otherwise zero. 
Sub-standard adopter = Indicator variable equal to one if the firm implemented 
a sub-standard director SOR (i.e., less than three times 
the annual director retainer); otherwise zero. 
Financial irregularity = Indicator variable equal to one if the firm experiences a 
financial restatement due to fraud, GAAP error or 
other issue, an SEC investigation, or a board initiated 
investigation (according to Audit Analytics); and zero 
otherwise. 
Forced CEO turnover = Indicator variable set to one if there has been a change 
in the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) position in the 
current fiscal year and the CEO is less than 60 years of 
age; otherwise zero. 
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Board size = Total number of directors on the firm’s board (from 
Incentive Lab). 
Outside director pct = Number of outside directors on the company’s board 
(derived from Incentive Lab) / total number of outside 
directors on the company’s board. 
Outside ownership pct = Percentage of stock held by firm’s outside directors. 
Board tenure = Average number of years outside directors have served 
on the board. 
Busy board pct = Percentage of outside directors that sit on three or more 
other boards. 
CEO ownership pct = Percentage of stock held by the CEO. 
Institutional ownership pct = Percentage of stock held by institutional owners from 
Thomson Reuters. 
Analyst following = Number of analysts that provided an EPS estimate for 
the firm in the last annual period. 
Growth firm = Indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s book-to-
market ratio is higher than the median for the year; 
zero otherwise. 
Guidance provider = Indicator variable equal to one if the firm provided 
managerial guidance in the past year. 
ROA = Net income divided by assets (ib/at). 
Returns = Firm’s stock returns over the fiscal year. 
Std dev returns = Standard deviation of returns over the fiscal year. 
Firm age = Age of the firm as of the end of the fiscal year 
(determined from Compustat). 
Firm size = Natural log of assets. 
BTM = Book value of assets divided by market value of 
equity. 
Sales growth = Percentage change in sales from prior year. 
MA = Indicator variable equal to one if firm was part of a 
merger and acquisition in the current period; otherwise 
zero. 
Leverage = Firm’s long-term liabilities divided by total assets 
(lt/at). 
Litigious = Indicator variable equal to one if firm is in a litigious 
industry based on the following SIC codes: 2833-2836, 
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3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370-7374, 8731-
8734; otherwise zero. 
Big N = Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is audited by 
one of the Big N public accounting firms; otherwise 
zero. 
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APPENDIX B 
This table reports the results of a logistic regression where the dependent variable is Director 
SOR, equal to one if the firm has a director SOR in the current fiscal year and 0 otherwise. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. Continuous variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1%. The regression includes year and industry (i.e., Fama-French 12 industry 
portfolios) fixed effects. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
Dependent variable =  
                    Director SOR  Coef SE 
 Intercept  -7.1131*** 0.3366 
 Board size t-1  0.0747*** 0.00876 
 Outside director p 
ctt-1 
 1.7685*** 0.2012 
 Outside ownership pctt-1  -0.7489*** 0.1311 
 Board tenure t-1  0.0114* 0.00629 
 Busy board pctt-1  0.1542 0.2088 
 CEO ownership pctt-1  -4.5808*** 0.4581 
 Institutional ownership 
pctt-1 
 0.347*** 0.0732 
 Analyst followingt-1  0.0274*** 0.00346 
 Growth firmst-1  0.074 0.0488 
 Provides guidancet-1  0.1589*** 0.0568 
 ROA t-1  0.3332 0.2519 
 Returns t-1  -0.0012 0.0498 
 Standard deviation of 
returns t-1 
 -4.6087** 2.1854 
 Firm age t-1  0.00886*** 0.00156 
 Firm size t-1  0.1143*** 0.022 
Year and Industry FE 
Included? 
 Yes  
Observations  13,296  
LR χ2  7,357***  
Area under the ROC curve  0.868  
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APPENDIX C 
Panel A of this table reports estimates of excess CEO compensation as reported by Kim et al. (2014). 
Panel B reports estimates of a replication of Kim et al. (2014) using compensation data for the fiscal 
years 2001 to 2013. Dependent variables are natural log-transformed Total Compensation, Total Cash 
and Equity Compensation from Incentive Lab for the fiscal years 2001 to 2013. The Pre-SFAS 123R 
period includes compensation years prior to 2006, and the SFAS123R period includes compensation 
years from 2006 to 2013. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Continuous variables are winsorized 
at the top and bottom 1%. The regression includes industry (i.e., Fama-French 48 industry portfolios) 
fixed effects. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by 
***, **, and *, respectively, in two-tailed tests. T-statistics are based on standard errors that clustered at 
the firm level. 
Panel A: Kim et al. (2014) using Morningstar from 2004 to 2008 
  Pre-SFAS123R Period SFAS 123R Period 
  Total Compt Cash Compt Equity Compt Total Compt Cash Compt Equity Compt 
 Intercept  10.319*** 10.715*** -1.775*** 10.188*** 11.326*** -1.034*** 
 ROA t-1  0.152** 0.191* -0.479 -0.230 0.036 -3.826*** 
 Returns t-1  0.225*** 0.210*** 0.180 0.162*** 0.073** 0.029 
 Iriskt-1  0.473** -0.615** -4.806** -0.327 -1.718*** 2.768** 
 LnAssetst-1  0.430*** 0.338*** 0.883*** 0.479*** 0.243*** 1.282*** 
 MTB-Equityt-1  0.040*** 0.026*** 0.058*** 0.031*** 3.7E -5 0.069*** 
 Leveraget-1  0.133*** 0.086 1.734*** 0.055 -0.192*** 0.923*** 
 Cash Surplust-1    -1.115*   3.225*** 
 Mtax-Effectt-1    -6.8E -5   6.3E -4* 
Industry FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  7,717 7,717 6,988 9,692 9,692 9,492 
Adjusted R2  0.5050 0.2371 0.1366 0.3620 0.1217 0.1848 
Panel B: Replication of Kim et al. (2014) using Incentive Lab from 2001 to 2013 
  Pre-SFAS123R Period SFAS 123R Period 
  Total Compt Cash Compt Equity Compt Total Compt Cash Compt Equity Compt 
 Intercept  10.795*** 11.696*** -9.329*** 12.268*** 12.513*** 6.014*** 
 ROA t-1  0.838*** 0.666*** 1.053 0.247 0.222 -0.361 
 Returns t-1  0.143*** 0.136*** 0.079 0.133*** -0.009 0.471*** 
 Iriskt-1  -0.535* -0.374 -6.330*** 0.249 0.537 -5.496*** 
 LnAssetst-1  0.414*** 0.281*** 1.396*** 0.356*** 0.157*** 0.918*** 
 MTB-Equityt-1  0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 Leveraget-1  0.535*** 0.437*** 1.694*** 0.234 0.433** 0.561 
 Cash Surplust-1    -0.000   -0.000** 
 Mtax-Effectt-1    0.000*   0.000 
Industry FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  7,357 7,357 7,357 8,187 8,187 8,187 
Adjusted R2  0.2800 0.2150 0.1720 0.1430 0.0803 0.0738 
        
 55 
 
FIGURE 1 
ADOPTION OF DIRECTOR STOCK OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENTS (SORs) 
This figure depicts trends in the number of firms employing a director stock ownership requirements (SOR) from 1998 to 2013 
in Incentive Lab (n=1,048). The dark portions of the bars indicate the number of firms continuing the use of a director SOR 
while the light portions indicate the number of firms adopting a director SOR in the period.  
 
 
39 
893 
 56 
 
FIGURE 2 
DIRECTOR SOR COMPARED TO ACTUAL DIRECTOR OWNERSHIP 
This figure compares required director stock ownership to the actual minimum and median director stock ownership in the year 
of adoption. The line with diamond markers represents the average director ownership requirement for all adopting firms in a 
given year. The solid (patterned) grey portion of the bar represents the average minimum (median) director ownership for all 
adopting firms in a given year. 
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TABLE 1 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
Panel A: Sample selection   
  
Firm-
years: 
All 
 Firm-
years: 
SOR=1 
 Firm-
years: 
Adopt=1 
Intersection of Incentive Lab and Compustat  21,387  6,892  1,048 
Less: Firms missing variables from Compustat  (611)  (37)  (13) 
Less: Firms missing variables from CRSP  (1,319)  (142)  (77) 
Less: Firms missing variables for CEO or 
director data from Incentive Lab or 
ExecuComp 
 (3,618)  (700)  (168) 
Less: Fi ms missing t-1 or t+1  (2,543)  (1,471)  (76) 
Full Sample  13,296  4,542  714 
Propensity Score Matched (PSM) Sample  8,418  3,442  481 
     
Panel B: Sample by year     
  Full Sample  PSM Sample 
Year  
Firm-
years: 
All 
 Firm-
years: 
SOR=1 
 Firm-
years: 
Adopt=1  
Firm-
years: 
All 
 Firm-
years: 
SOR=1 
 Firm-
years: 
Adopt=1 
1998  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1999  686  0  0  402  0  0 
2000  886  5  5  506  5  5 
2001  961  8  3  542  8  3 
2002  988  28  20  569  28  20 
2003  1,002  82  54  593  81  53 
2004  987  155  73  596  152  71 
2005  951  251  96  600  236  84 
2006  902  340  92  602  298  62 
2007  875  424  90  597  359  67 
2008  889  457  53  603  360  17 
2009  899  497  57  602  366  22 
2010  878  535  60  591  384  35 
2011  845  584  68  575  395  22 
2012  810  607  43  549  401  20 
2013  737  569  0  491  369  0 
Total  13,296  4,542  714  8,418  3,442  481 
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TABLE 2 
DIRECTOR SORs AT TIME OF ADOPTION 
This table provides a summary of director SORs adopted by Incentive Lab firms. A Multiple of Retainer requirement is defined as a policy requiring 
directors to hold a multiple of x times their annual retainer or base fees. A Shares requirement is defined as a policy requiring directors to hold a fixed 
amount of shares. A Dollar Value requirement is defined as a policy requiring non-employee directors to hold a fixed dollar value of shares. A 
Combination requirement indicates that the amount of stock a director is required to own is based on a combination of Multiple of Retainer, Dollar 
Value and Shares requirements, typically in the form of the lesser of two requirements. Ownership requirement ($) is the equivalent dollar value of 
ownership required for the median outside director. Actual ownership is the median outside director’s ownership calculated as the number of shares 
held multiplied by the share price at the close of the fiscal year. 
Panel A: Full sample (n=714)   
Type of Requirement  Firms  Ownership requirement  Ownership requirement  
($000s) 
 Actual ownership 
($000s) 
  N  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Multiple of Retainer  454  3.88x 4.00x  $246.5 $210.0  $1,846.3 $989.3 
Shares   152  7,415 
shares 
5,000 shares  $240.6 $184.4  $2,755.4 $1,305.1 
Dollar Value ($000s)  81  $257,300 $200,000  $257.3 $200.0  $1,871.7 $887.2 
Combination  27  - -  $196.8 $177.6  $1,514.6 $919.3 
Total  714  - -  $244.6 $200.0  $2,030.2 $993.5 
            
Panel B: PSM sample (n=481)    
Type of Requirement  Firms  Ownership requirement  Ownership requirement  
($000s) 
 Actual ownership 
($000s) 
  N  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Multiple of Retainer  303  3.86x 4.00x  $216.4 $180.0  $1,890.7 $1,079.1 
Shares   112  7,495 
shares 
5,000 shares  $238.6 $176.2  $2,839.1 $1,305.1 
Dollar Value ($000s)  52  $276,600 $187,500  $276.6 $187.5  $1,815.9 $853.1 
Combination  14  - -  $168.9 $154.9  $1,525.2 $818.6 
Total  481  - -  $226.7 $177.5  $2,092.8 $1,079.1 
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TABLE 3 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This table compares the mean and median values of the selection variables in the propensity-score model. Panel A provides descriptive statistics for 
sample firms (with and without a director stock ownership requirement (SOR)). Panel B provides descriptive statistics for all matched (treatment and 
control) firms. Variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percent.  
Panel A: Difference in means and medians for selection variables prior to matching 
  Firms adopting a director SOR  Firms without a director SOR  Difference 
in Means 
Difference 
in Medians 
  n = 714  n = 516  
Variable  Mean Median St Dev  Mean Median St Dev    
Board sizet  10.441 10.000 2.857  9.438 9.000 3.361  *** *** 
Outside director pctt  0.844 0.875 0.116  0.810 0.843 0.153  *** *** 
Outside ownership pctt  0.077 0.024 0.859  0.294 0.038 2.425  ** *** 
Board tenuret  4.119 3.500 4.102  3.002 0.000 4.406  *** *** 
Busy board pctt  0.075 0.000 0.116  0.060 0.000 0.125  ** *** 
CEO ownership pctt  0.018 0.007 0.045  0.058 0.012 0.310  *** *** 
Institutional ownership 
pctt 
 0.706 0.785 0.318  0.552 0.626 0.345  *** *** 
Analyst followingt  11.881 11.000 8.041  7.533 6.000 7.954  *** *** 
Guidance providert  0.256 0.000 0.437  0.142 0.000 0.349  *** *** 
ROAt  0.051 0.050 0.088  0.005 0.029 0.169  *** *** 
Returnst  0.169 0.111 0.447  0.137 0.025 0.696   *** 
St dev of returnst  0.023 0.020 0.013  0.031 0.027 0.017  *** *** 
Firm sizet  8.632 8.480 1.448  7.822 7.717 1.684  *** *** 
Firm aget  29.810 24.000 17.271  20.333 14.000 15.308  *** *** 
           
          (continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
Panel B: Difference in means and medians for selection variables after propensity-score matching 
  Firms adopting a director SOR  Firms without a director SOR  Difference 
in Means 
Difference 
in Medians 
  n = 481  n = 220  
Variable  Mean Median St Dev  Mean Median St Dev    
Board sizet-1  10.085 10.000 2.881  10.450 10.000 3.802    
Outside director pct t-1  0.824 0.857 0.128  0.843 0.875 0.121  * * 
Outside ownership pctt-1  0.123 0.025 1.433  0.237 0.022 2.606    
Board tenure t-1  3.963 3.000 4.236  3.307 1.000 4.707  * *** 
Busy board pct t-1  0.080 0.000 0.120  0.062 0.000 0.116  * ** 
CEO ownership pct t-1  0.021 0.008 0.049  0.028 0.008 0.060    
Institutional ownership pct 
t-1 
 0.646 0.741 0.326  0.592 0.708 0.359  *  
Analyst following t-1  10.572 10.000 7.979  9.536 9.000 8.477   * 
Guidance provider t-1  0.236 0.000 0.425  0.177 0.000 0.383  * * 
ROA t-1  0.045 0.048 0.093  0.048 0.047 0.083    
Returnst-1  0.248 0.147 0.851  0.185 0.148 0.541    
St dev of returns t-1  0.023 0.021 0.011  0.024 0.021 0.015    
Firm size t-1  8.408 8.217 1.4584  8.369 8.141 1.618    
Firm age t-1  26.855 20.500 16.787  24.659 18.000 16.540   * 
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TABLE 4 
DETERMINANTS OF DIRECTOR SOR ADOPTION 
This table reports the results of regressions where the dependent variable is Adopter, equal to one if the firm 
adopts a director SOR in the current fiscal year and 0 if the firm never adopted a director SOR. Column (1) 
presents coefficients from a logistic regression with year and industry (i.e., Fama-French 12 industry 
portfolios) fixed effects while Column (2) presents coefficients from a Cox proportional hazard model with 
industry fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Continuous variables are winsorized at the top 
and bottom 1%. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, 
**, and *, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
   
Logistic model 
(1) 
Hazard model 
(2) 
 Intercept    -5.309***  
Variables of interest      
 ROA t-1 H1a -  0.027 0.148 
 Returns t-1 H1a -  0.257 0.159** 
 Board outside ownership pctt-1 H1b -  -0.668*** -0.509** 
 Board outside director pctt-1 H1c +  1.154** 1.369*** 
 Institutional ownership pctt-1 H1d -  0.546** 0.374*** 
 Analyst followingt-1 H1e -  0.047*** 0.015** 
 Guidance providert-1 H1e -  0.287 0.078 
Other board and firm 
characteristics 
    
 Board size t-1    0.019 0.017 
 Board tenure t-1    0.010 -0.005 
 Busy board pctt-1    -0.447 -0.483 
 CEO ownership pctt-1    -4.549*** -3.534*** 
 Growth firmt-1    0.311* 0.102 
 Standard deviation of returns t-
1 
   -17.576** -9.340** 
 Firm age t-1    0.023*** 0.000 
 Firm size t-1    0.133 0.097** 
      
Fixed Effects?    Industry & Year Industry 
      
Observations    1,230 9,417 
Observations with director SOR adoption 714 714 
LR χ2    276.0***  
      
    (continued on next page) 
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TABLE 5 
CONSEQUENCES OF DIRECTOR SOR ADOPTION:  
FINANCIAL REPORTING MONITORING 
This table reports the results of logistic regressions of the likelihood of financial irregularities. The 
dependent variable in all models is Financial irregularity, defined as equal to one if the firm experienced 
a restatement due to fraud, GAAP error or other restatement, or if the firm was involved in an SEC 
investigation or a board instigated investigation according to Audit Analytics; otherwise zero. Column 1 
(2) presents results using the full (propensity-score match) sample of firm-years where each treatment 
and control firm has at least three years of data (t-1 to t+1). Treatment firms refer to firms that have 
adopted a director SOR (Adopter=1) and control firms refer to firms that have not adopted a director 
SOR (Adopter=0). The indicator variable Post is equal to one for firm-years including or after the event 
year and zero for firms-years prior to the event year. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. To 
reduce the influence of outliers, continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. All 
regressions include year and industry (i.e., Fama-French 12 industry portfolios) fixed effects. Statistical 
significance is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, in two-tailed 
tests. 
Panel A:Test of H2a   
 Full sample (1) PSM sample (2) 
Intercept -1.787*** -1.657*** 
Adoptert 0.133** 0.124 
Postt -0.242*** -0.189 
Adoptert x Postt  -0.184* -0.237* 
Board sizet -0.027*** -0.015 
Outside director pctt -0.265 -0.532** 
Outside ownership pctt 0.003 0.001 
Board tenuret -0.003 -0.005 
Busy board pctt -0.417** -0.163 
Firm sizet -0.028 -0.045* 
ROAt -0.162 -0.412* 
BTMt 0.336*** 0.376*** 
Sales growtht -0.001** -0.042 
MAt 0.011 -0.079 
CEO ownership pctt 0.305* -0.229 
Institutional ownership pctt -0.178** -0.336*** 
Leveraget 0.763*** 0.714*** 
Firm aget -0.005*** -0.001 
Litigioust 0.081 0.032 
Big Nt 0.570*** 0.486*** 
Year and Industry FE included? Yes Yes 
Observations 13,261 8,393 
LR χ2 583.0*** 421.5*** 
Area under the ROC curve 0.6582 0.6665 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
Panel B: Test of H2b   
 Full sample PSM sample 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Intercept -1.798*** -1.820*** -1.655*** -1.711*** 
Non-Compelling Adoptert 0.053 0.052 0.087 0.086 
Compelling Adoptert 0.237***  0.175*  
Compelling, Substandard Adoptert  0.372***  0.268 
Compelling, Standard Adoptert  0.158  0.191 
Compelling, Robust Adoptert  0.228**  0.098 
Non-Compelling Adoptert x Post -0.094 -0.095 -0.135 -0.133 
Compelling Adoptert x Post -0.297**  -0.371**  
Compelling, Sub Adoptert x Postt  -0.039  0.066 
Compelling, Standard Adoptert x Postt  -0.268*  -0.582*** 
Compelling, Robust Adoptert x Postt  -0.496***  -0.458** 
Postt -0.245*** -0.245*** -0.189 -0.193 
Board size t -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.014 -0.014 
Board outside pctt -0.247 -0.230 -0.531** -0.509** 
Board outside ownership pctt 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 
Board tenuret -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 
Busy board pctt -0.435** -0.415** -0.174 -0.134 
Firm sizet -0.031 -0.030 -0.046* -0.048* 
ROAt -0.158 -0.153 -0.412* -0.387* 
BTMt 0.334*** 0.336*** 0.375*** 0.379*** 
Sales growtht -0.001* -0.001* -0.041 -0.042 
MAt 0.013 0.010 -0.081 -0.086 
CEO ownership pctt 0.306* 0.323* -0.221 -0.150 
Institutional ownership pctt -0.174** -0.175** -0.331*** -0.325*** 
Leveraget 0.761*** 0.774*** 0.719*** 0.760*** 
Firm aget -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 
Litigioust 0.087 0.079 0.034 0.023 
Big Nt 0.573*** 0.567*** 0.480*** 0.478*** 
Year and Industry FE Included? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 13,261 13,261 8,393 8,393 
LR χ2 589.1*** 601.9*** 424.0*** 431.7*** 
Area under the ROC curve 0.6589 0.6607 0.6675 0.6710 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
H2b: Compelling Adoptert x Postt < Non-Compelling Adoptert x Postt 
Wald χ2 =  3.36*  3.04*  
 
H2b: Compelling, Robust Adoptert x Postt < Non-Compelling Adoptert x Postt 
Wald χ2 =   6.92***  2.94** 
 
H2b: Compelling, Robust Adoptert x Postt < Compelling, Substandard Adoptert x 
Postt Wald χ2 =   4.75**  4.02** 
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TABLE 6 
CONSEQUENCES OF DIRECTOR SOR ADOPTION:  
CEO PERFORMANCE MONITORING 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. The dependent 
variable in all models is Forced CEO turnover, defined as equal to one if the firm experiences a change in 
CEO when the CEO is less than 60 years old; otherwise zero. Column 1 (Column 2) presents results using 
the full (propensity-score match) sample of firm-years where each treatment and control firm has at least 
three years of data (t-1 to t+1). Treatment firms refer to firms that have adopted a director SOR (Adopter=1) 
and control firms refer to firms that have not adopted a director SOR (Adopter=0). The indicator variable 
Post is equal to one for firm-years including or after the event year and zero for firms-years prior to the 
event year. The event year is year of adoption for treatment firms and randomly selected for control firms 
in the full sample. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. To reduce the influence of outliers, 
continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. All regressions include year and industry 
(i.e., Fama-French 12 industry portfolios) fixed effects. Statistical significance is indicated at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
Panel A: Test of H3a   
 Full sample PSM sample 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept 0.037* 0.016 
Adoptert 0.005 0.010 
Postt 0.013 0.002 
Poor performancet 0.000 0.005 
Adoptert x Postt -0.010 -0.008 
Postt x Poor performancet 0.004 0.015 
Adoptert x Postt x Poor performancet 0.002 -0.005 
Board sizet 0.000 -0.000 
Board outside pctt -0.011 -0.007 
Board outside ownership pctt -0.001* 0.001 
Board tenuret -0.001** -0.002*** 
Busy boardt 0.004 0.000 
Ln MVEt 0.005*** 0.008*** 
Year and Industry FE included? Yes Yes 
Observations 12,285 7,829 
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.007 
   
 (continued on next page) 
 
 
 66 
 
TABLE 6 (continued) 
Panel B: Test of H3b 
 Full sample PSM sample 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Intercept 0.038* 0.038* 0.016 0.015 
Non-Compelling Adoptert -0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.007 
Compelling Adoptert 0.009  0.014  
Compelling, Substandard Adoptert  0.028  0.034 
Compelling, Standard Adoptert  0.006  0.017 
Compelling, Robust Adoptert  -0.001  0.001 
Postt 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.002 
Poor performancet -0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.005 
Non-Compelling Adoptert x Postt -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 
Compelling Adoptert x Postt -0.013  -0.014  
Compelling, Substandard Adoptert x Postt  -0.002  -0.019 
Compelling, Standard Adoptert x Postt  -0.003  -0.004 
Compelling, Robust Adoptert x Postt  -0.023  -0.016 
Non-Compelling Adoptert x Poor perft -0.000 -0.000 -0.007 -0.007 
Compelling Adoptert x Poor perft 0.006  0.005  
Compelling, Substandard Adoptert x Poor perft  0.005  0.005 
Compelling, Standard Adoptert x Poor perft  -0.003  -0.025 
Compelling, Robust Adoptert x Poor perft  0.019  0.032 
Postt x Poor performancet 0.007 0.007 0.014 0.015 
Non-Compelling Adoptert x Postt x Poor perft -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
Compelling Adoptert x Postt x Poor perft -0.002  -0.005  
Compelling, Subt x Postt x Poor perft  -0.015  -0.018 
Compelling, Standardt x Postt x Poor perft  -0.015  -0.002 
Compelling, Robustt x Postt x Poor perft  0.011  -0.007 
Board sizet 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Board outside pctt -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 
Board outside ownership pctt -0.001* -0.001** 0.001 0.001 
Board tenuret -0.001** -0.001** -
0.002**
* 
-
0.002**
* 
Busy boardt 0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.003 
Ln MVEt 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
     
Year and Industry FE included? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,285 12,285 7,829 7,829 
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.014 
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TABLE 7 
CONSEQUENCES OF DIRECTOR SOR ADOPTION: CEO COMPENSATION MONITORING 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of excess CEO compensation. The dependent variables are excess total compensation, excess cash 
compensation, and excess equity compensation, measured as the residuals from regressions in Appendix C, following Kim et al. (2014). Columns 1-3 (4-6) 
present results using the full (propensity-score match) sample of firm-years where each treatment and control firm has at least three years of data (t-1 to t+1). 
Treatment firms refer to firms that have adopted a director SOR (Adopter=1) and control firms refer to firms that have not adopted a director SOR (Adopter=0). 
The indicator variable Post is equal to one for firm-years including or after the event year and zero for firms-years prior to the event year. The event year is 
year of adoption for treatment firms and randomly selected for control firms in the full sample. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. To reduce the 
influence of outliers, continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. All regressions include year and industry (i.e., Fama-French 48 industry 
portfolios) fixed effects. Statistical significance is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
Panel A: Test of H4a   
 Full sample PSM sample 
 Total Comp Cash Comp Equity Comp Total Comp Cash Comp Equity 
Comp  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.491* -0.395 -2.408*** -0.214 -0.070 -2.840*** 
Adoptert 0.107* 0.065 0.779*** 0.040 0.029 0.404 
Postt -0.105 -0.068 0.022 -0.091 0.011 -0.151 
Adoptert x Postt 0.303*** 0.172** 0.836** 0.275*** 0.109 1.155** 
Board sizet 0.041*** 0.036** 0.157*** 0.016** 0.012* 0.128*** 
Board outside pctt 0.444 0.298 2.275*** 0.075 -0.120 2.729*** 
Board outside ownership pctt -0.006* -0.001 -0.051 0.002 -0.000 -0.016*** 
Board tenuret 0.009 0.012 -0.028 -0.001 0.004 -0.043 
Busy boardt 0.604*** 0.291** 2.882*** 0.541*** 0.214* 3.167*** 
Ln MVEt -0.075** -0.057* -0.317*** -0.027 -0.016 -0.216** 
Year and Industry FE included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,043 13,043 13,043 8,278 8,278 8,278 
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.022 0.042 0.026 0.017 0.041 
       
    (continued on next page) 
 68 
 
TABLE 7 (continued) 
Panel B: Test of H4b 
 Full sample PSM sample 
 
Total 
Comp 
 (1) 
Equity 
Comp 
Total 
Comp 
Equity 
Comp 
Total 
Comp 
Equity 
Comp 
Total 
Comp 
Equity 
Comp 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept -0.519** -0.64*** -0.522** -2.64*** -0.410** -3.01*** -0.404** -2.93*** 
Non-Compelling Adoptert 0.085 0.797** 0.085 0.795** 0.042 0.432 0.042 0.431 
Compelling Adoptert 0.119* 0.684*   0.033 0.331   
Compelling, Substandard Adoptert   0.248** 1.576**   0.117 1.379 
Compelling, Standard Adoptert   0.092 0.262   0.013 -0.309 
Compelling, Robust Adoptert   0.081 0.655   0.010 0.440 
Non-Compelling Adoptert x Post 0.323*** 0.823** 0.323*** 0.820** 0.265*** 1.103** 0.266*** 1.104** 
Compelling Adoptert x Post 0.287*** 0.881**   0.286*** 1.283**   
Compelling, Substandard Adoptert x Postt   0.216* 0.452   0.228 0.560 
Compelling, Standard Adoptert x Postt   0.265** 0.919*   0.266** 1.553** 
Compelling, Robust Adoptert x Postt   0.338*** 1.016*   0.332*** 1.333* 
Postt -0.111 0.003 -0.112 -0.003 -0.104 -0.202 -0.104 -0.205 
Board sizet 0.032** 0.115*** 0.032** 0.116*** 0.008 0.099*** 0.008 0.100*** 
Board outside pctt 0.429 2.193*** 0.434 2.207*** 0.079 2.664*** 0.080 2.678*** 
Board outside ownership pctt -0.005* -0.049 -0.006* -0.052 0.002 -0.01*** 0.002 -0.01*** 
Board tenuret 0.009 -0.028 0.009 -0.027 -0.002 -0.043 -0.002 -0.043 
Busy boardt 0.600*** 2.846*** 0.600*** 2.848*** 0.470*** 3.177*** 0.477*** 3.308*** 
Ln MVEt -0.059* -0.23*** -0.060* -0.23*** 0.010 -0.153 0.008 -0.167* 
Year and Industry FE included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,043 13,043 13,043 13,043 8,278 8,278 8,278 8,278 
Adjusted R2 0.030 0.040 0.032 0.042 0.025 0.040 0.026 0.041 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
 
H4b: Compelling Adoptert x Postt < Non-Compelling Adoptert x Postt 
F-test =  0.28 0.02   0.10 0.14   
          
H4b: Compelling, Robust Adoptert x Postt < Non-Compelling Adoptert x Postt 
F-test =    0.04 0.14   0.69 0.11 
          
H4b: Compelling, Robust Adoptert x Postt < Compelling, Substandard Adoptert x Postt 
F-test =    0.28 0.02   0.10 0.14 
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TABLE 8 
DETERMINANTS OF SUBSTANTIAL AND SYMBOLIC  
DIRECTOR SOR ADOPTION 
This table reports the results of a generalized-ordered logistic regression where the dependent variable is Type 
of SOR is equal to zero if the firm does not adopt a director SOR, one if the firm adopts a symbolic director 
SOR, and two if the firm adopts a substantial director SOR. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The regression includes year and industry (i.e., 
Fama-French 12 industry portfolios) fixed effects. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
  
Symbolic 
(1) 
Substantial 
(2) 
)  Intercept  -5.539*** -3.938*** 
Variables of interest    
 ROA t-1  0.301 0.529 
 Returns t-1  0.251 0.109 
 Board outside director pctt-1  1.047* -1.135* 
 Board outside ownership pctt-1  -0.720** -5.003*** 
 Institutional ownership pctt-1  0.703*** 0.231 
 Analyst followingt-1  0.044*** 0.012 
 Guidance providert-1  0.224 -0.016 
Other board and firm characteristics  
 Board size t-1  0.025 0.007 
 Board tenure t-1  0.014 -0.080*** 
 Busy board pctt-1  -0.871 1.026 
 CEO ownership pctt-1  -5.100*** -0.827 
 Growth firm t-1  0.300* -0.145 
 Standard deviation of returns t-
1 
 -15.986** 2.062 
 Firm age t-1  0.024*** 0.012** 
 Firm size t-1  0.131* 0.107 
    
Year and Industry FE 
Included? 
 Yes  
Observations  1,230  
Obs with adoption  454 260 
    
LR χ2  633.8***  
Pseudo R2  0.243  
    
 
